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Of Mommy Tracks and Glass Ceilings : A Case Study of Men's and Women's Careers in Management

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Résumé de l'article

Le débat public sur la discrimination et la vie familiale montre que les gens se demandent si la carrière des femmes en gestion est entravée par la discrimination et si ceux et celles qui cherchent à équilibrer famille et carrière sont pénalisés. Cette recherche se centre sur ces questions en scrutant les résultats de carrière de 600 gestionnaires intermédiaires dans une grande compagnie canadienne. Nous avons examiné les effets du sexe et de la participation dans le travail domestique sur une grande variété de résultats. Utilisant une mesure de participation au travail domestique, nous avons classifié les gestionnaires selon qu'ils étaient orientés d'abord et avant tout sur leur carrière ou de façon relativement égale à la fois sur leur carrière et sur leur famille. Pour élaborer des hypothèses vérifiables dans le cadre de cette recherche, nous avons recouru à la théorie du capital humain, à la théorie de la discrimination statistique et à la théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels. Brièvement dit, la logique de la théorie du capital humain propose que la participation au travail domestique est associée aux résultats atteints sur le marché du travail. Ceux qui choisissent de dépenser plus d'effort dans du travail hors marché vont se dépenser moins dans leur emploi afin de sauver de l'énergie. Pour ce motif, ceux qui participent beaucoup au travail domestique devraient se retrouver dans des emplois moins exigeants, toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, et moins rémunérateurs. La logique de la discrimination statistique, pour sa part, propose qu'il y aura une relation entre le sexe et les résultats sur le marché du travail. Parce que les employeurs croient que les femmes ont moins de probabilités que les hommes à être gestionnaires efficaces et à demeurer longtemps avec la firme, ils affecteront les femmes à des positions administratives moins exigeantes et moins rémunératrices. Enfin, la logique de la théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels propose qu'il y aura une relation négative plus forte pour les hommes que pour les femmes entre le travail domestique et le succès sur le marché du travail. Dans les sociétés industrielles occidentales, les femmes ont davantage la responsabilité des tâches ménagères et les hommes, un rôle de pourvoyeur. Les gens sont récompensés quand ils remplissent leur rôle présent et punis pour ces comportements qui divergent trop de ces rôles. Cela implique que les employeurs peuvent être plus enclins à répondre positivement aux femmes qu'aux hommes au désir d'équilibrer carrière et famille. En 1989, nous avons envoyé des questionnaires à un échantillon de 800 cadres intermédiaires choisis au hasard dans neuf bureaux régionaux d'une grande firme canadienne, 672 (84 %) de ces questionnaires nous furent retournés. Nous avons mesuré la participation au travail domestique en demandant quel pourcentage de la cuisine familiale, de l'entretien et du transport des enfants était effectué par le répondant. La somme de ces trois pourcentages a constitué l'indice de participation au travail domestique. Ceux se situant au-dessus de la médiane de cet indice sont considérés comme des gestionnaires carrière-famille et ceux se situant sous la médiane sont appelés des gestionnaires de carrière d'abord. En utilisant ces définitions, nous avons identifié dans l'échantillon 246 femmes et 78 hommes carrière-famille, 26 femmes et 322 hommes carrière d'abord. Le salaire était associé de façon significative et négative avec le genre féminin dans l'analyse multivariée que nous avons faite tant pour l'échantillon dans son ensemble que pour le sous-échantillon « sans diplôme de deuxième cycle ». Cependant, le salaire n'était pas une variable significative dans l'analyse effectuée sur le sous-échantillon « avec diplôme de deuxième cycle », peut-être parce que, dans ce sous-échantillon, nous avons contrôlé le domaine de spécialisation du diplôme. Si nous avions été capables de contrôler cette variable dans le sous-échantillon « sans diplôme de deuxième cycle », les différences sexuelles dans le salaire auraient peut-être été atténuées. Nous concluons donc que les choix individuels de domaine de spécialisation peuvent expliquer les salaires inférieurs des femmes dans ce cas. Cependant, les contrôles pour le domaine de spécialisation n'expliquent pas l'effet du sexe sur les occasions perçues de promotion. Les différences sexuelles de perception d'être préparé pour des postes de haute direction étaient plus grandes dans le sous-échantillon « avec un diplôme de deuxième cycle ». Cette conclusion indique que les femmes plus instruites — que l'on devrait trouver près du sommet de la hiérarchie — se perçoivent désavantagées dans leurs chances d'avancement comparativement aux hommes. Cette différence de perception peut constituer la preuve de l'existence d'un « plafond de verre » au niveau hiérarchique au-delà duquel les femmes n'ont pas accès. Cependant, les différences de sexe dans le niveau hiérarchique actuel n'ont pas été significatives dans plusieurs analyses multivariées effectuées. Nous avons conclu que si un « plafond de verre » existait dans cette compagnie, il devait être situé à un niveau supérieur aux postes de cadre intermédiaire étudiés. L'interaction entre le sexe et le travail domestique est associée de façon significative pour l'ensemble de l'échantillon et pour les deux sous-échantillons, i.e. avec et sans diplôme de deuxième cycle. Le sens de cette relation est à l'effet que la participation au travail domestique est associée négativement avec le niveau hiérarchique pour les hommes et positivement pour les femmes. Nous ne connaissons pas la direction de causalité de cet effet. Il est possible que l'employeur ait pénalisé les hommes carrière-famille en ralentissant leur avancement hiérarchique. Il est aussi possible que ces hommes qui ont réalisé que leur avancement avait ralenti aient choisi en réaction de consacrer une plus grande proportion de leur temps et de leur effort à la famille. Des données longitudinales seraient nécessaires pour choisir entre ces deux possibilités. Ces deux explications sont cependant conformes à la théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels. La théorie suggère que des comportements contraires aux rôles sexuels seront punis. Si la première explication est correcte, alors elle est conforme à cette théorie de façon évidente. Si la seconde est correcte, il est alors nécessaire de comparer les comportements des hommes et des femmes pour trouver une conformité avec la théorie. Pourquoi les femmes dont la carrière est rendue à de hauts niveaux n'ont pas, comme les hommes, réduit leur participation au travail domestique pour compenser le fardeau additionnel dans leur emploi ? La théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels répondrait à cette question en disant que c'est en raison de la pression faite sur les femmes de se conformer au rôle féminin de responsable des tâches ménagères. Nous concluons, comme d'autres, que les hommes et les femmes gestionnaires sont sujets à des pressions de congruence de rôle sexuel. L'implication de ces résultats est que les hommes qui choisissent de profiter des aménagements de travail pour se consacrer davantage à leur famille peuvent être plus pénalisés que les femmes qui font de même.

Of Mommy Tracks and Glass Ceilings

A Case Study of Men's and Women's Careers in Management

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and
Kathy Cannings

Data from a 1989 survey of over 600 middle-level managers in a large Canadian corporation were analyzed to examine the characteristics of jobs held by career-family and career-primary men and women. Hypotheses were developed based on human capital theory, statistical discrimination theory, and gender role congruence theory. Examining career outcomes suggested that participation in household labor had a significantly more negative association with men's hierarchical level than with women's. Implications for theory and suggestions for research are discussed.

The phrase "glass ceiling" was coined in the mid-1980's (*Wall Street Journal* March 24, 1986) in recognition of the discrimination in promotion opportunities faced by women in management.¹ The flurry of popular press

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¹ Findings on the impact of being female on the probability of receiving a promotion are mixed, with some studies indicating a male advantage (e.g., Cannings 1988; Eberts and Stone 1985; Haberfeld 1992; Markham, South, Bonjean, and Corder 1985; Olson and Becker 1983; Spurr 1990), some indicating a female advantage (e.g., Gerhart and Milkovich 1989; Lewis 1986;

response to Felice Schwartz' (1989) influential *Harvard Business Review* article added to our vocabulary the concept of the "mommy track" (*Business Week* March 20, 1989). The mommy track encompasses a variety of organizational arrangements that allow women in management the opportunity to spend more hours at home with their young children. Schwartz' work engendered a new debate on whether mommy tracks would help or hinder the careers of women in management. Proponents of the mommy track argued that corporations must become more flexible and develop arrangements that allow women (and men) to focus their efforts on both career and family during their children's early years (Schwartz 1992). Opponents argued that mommy tracks would increase discrimination against women in management. Specifically, there were fears that women who choose a mommy track career path for a few years might be penalized for their actions later. Also, people feared that the availability of mommy track arrangements might cause all women to become suspect of intentions to switch to the mommy track at some point in their careers (*Wall Street Journal* April 22, 1992). Added to this debate was the question of what would happen to the careers of men in management who choose to participate extensively in child rearing (*USA Today* June 22, 1991).

This debate shows that the public is concerned about whether the management careers of women are hindered by discrimination and whether women and men in management who try to balance career and family are penalized for doing so. The present research was an attempt to address these questions by examining the career outcomes of over 600 middle-level managers in a large Canadian corporation. The effects of gender and participation in household labor on a broad range of outcomes were examined. Using a measure of

Gudykunst 1982), and some indicating no significant gender difference in promotion probabilities (e.g., Hartmann 1987; Shenhav 1991). One problem with studying promotions as an outcome variable is that all promotions are not equal. For example, promotion from one middle management level to another may be fairly common while promotion from middle management to functional or divisional head is relatively rare. Some previous studies avoid the problem of non-comparability of promotions by examining promotions to a particular level, for example, the probability of being promoted into management from the non-management ranks (Shenhav 1992; Steinberg, Haignere, and Chertos 1990), the probability of being promoted from teaching into an administrative position (Eberts and Stone 1985) the probability of being promoted into a Senior Executive Service position within the U.S. federal government (Powell and Butterfield 1994), and the probability of being promoted to partner in a law firm (Spurr 1990).

Nieva and Gutek (1980) found in their review of the literature that gender bias in evaluation is most likely when people are being considered for top level, prestigious positions. Studies which aggregate promotions at all levels cannot capture gender effects that may occur at the critical career stage where promotion to the highest organizational levels becomes a possibility. Indeed, findings reported by Haberfeld (1992), Killingsworth and Reimers (1983), and Stewart and Gudykunst (1982) indicated a significant male advantage in achieving higher organizational ranks. This suggests that number of promotions probably underestimates the negative effect of being female on hierarchical advancement.

participation in household labor, we classified managers as either career-primary, focused on career primarily or exclusively, or career-family, focused more equally on both career and family.

These data were particularly useful for examining gender and household labor effects because many potential alternative explanations for findings were controlled. The fact that all of the subjects worked for the same firm meant that differences in company policies, climate, culture, and working conditions were ruled out as alternative explanations. Additionally, we were able to assess characteristics of the position, defined as hierarchical level within functional department, by aggregating individual survey responses. This allowed us to examine the types of positions to which men and women, career-family and career-primary managers were assigned in addition to individual-level outcome variables like salaries. Because most previous research has focused on salary differences, a contribution of this research was the examination of a broad array of outcome variables.

Specifically, we examined the average pay level, average hours, skill, and commitment requirements, and average perceived promotion opportunities among all managers holding the same position. These variables allowed us to identify how demanding and rewarding the position was independent of characteristics of the individual position holder. For example, the average number of hours worked weekly among all position holders is a better assessment of the demands of the position than the individual's reported working hours because it is not as affected by the discretion of any individual position holder. Hence, any gender or household labor effects on the average hours worked in the position may be interpreted as effects on type of position held. By comparison, any gender or household labor effects on the individual's report of hours worked weekly doesn't necessarily indicate an effect on type of position held but may be partially due to individual variation in effort allocated to paid and unpaid work activities within the same position. Because our hypotheses pertained to types of positions held by men and women, career-family and career-primary managers, the inclusion of the position characteristics measures increased the construct validity of the research.

Human capital theory, statistical discrimination theory, and gender role congruence theory were used to develop testable hypotheses for this research. Each of these is discussed below.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Human Capital Theory

The human capital model suggests that individuals make the decision to develop marketable skills based on the future expected earnings returns to

those skills. The logic may be stated as follows. An important factor affecting expected earnings returns is expected level of lifetime labor force participation (Mincer and Polachek 1974). Individuals who expect their lifetime participation in the labor force to be relatively low will make fewer investments in their own skill levels. If women, on average, expect to conduct considerably less market work during their lifetimes than men in order to devote time to household labor, then human capital investments will be less valuable to women. As a result, women will be less likely to make human capital investments in themselves.

Extensions of this logic have been developed to derive more specific hypotheses. For example, Landes (1977) argued that women will be less likely than men to invest in firm specific skills. Firm specific skill investments are generally not recoverable when the worker who has left the labor force attempts to reenter. Since women are more likely than men on average to withdraw from the labor force to engage in household labor full time, firm specific skills are less valuable to women. As a result, women will be less likely to invest in firm specific skills.

Becker (1985) argued that, on average, women will exert less effort on the job than men. He argued that people who engage in a significant amount of household labor will exert less effort on the job to conserve energy. Since women exert considerably more effort on household labor than men, women will exert less effort on the job and will be less productive as a result. Consequently, women will be less deserving of market rewards than men on average.

In summary, the logic of human capital theory suggests that workers' choices to engage in household labor are important determinants of their labor market outcomes. Specifically, individuals who engage in a significant amount of household labor will choose less demanding positions that are also less rewarding in terms of earnings and other outcomes. These relationships should hold equally for men and women, in that men who choose to engage in a significant amount of household labor should experience the same market outcomes as their female counterparts.

Applying this logic to managers, the human capital model suggests that if managers expect either to reduce working hours, to take extended parental leaves, or to leave employment altogether for several years upon the arrival of children, which are common behaviors among female managers according to Schwartz (1989), then they will make fewer investments in their management skills. These individuals may fail to obtain graduate degrees in management, they may seek out fewer training opportunities with the organization, they may be less likely to bid for promotion to "fast track" positions seen as necessary experiences for top-level management, or they may simply work fewer hours

each week, because they are less likely to reap earnings returns on such investments.

We examined the current level of household labor engaged in by women and men in management to see if engaging in high levels of household labor was associated with career outcomes in the direction predicted by the logic of human capital theory. Specifically, individuals engaging in relatively high levels of household labor were expected to be employed in positions that were less demanding, in that they required a lower average level of work hours per week, as well as less education, less training, less commitment, and less firm specific experience. Such positions also should be commensurately less rewarding in that they should be at lower hierarchical levels on average and that they should offer, on average, lower salaries and less likelihood of promotion to top management. Finally, individuals engaging in high levels of household labor were expected to earn lower salaries, perceive fewer opportunities for promotion, and receive less training. These expectations are summarized in the following general hypothesis:

H1: Participation in household labor will be negatively associated with position demands and rewards.

Statistical Discrimination Theory

The statistical discrimination model emphasizes the impact of employers' choices on workers' labor market outcomes (Arrow 1972; 1973; Aigner and Cain 1977). The logic of statistical discrimination theory suggests that in order to minimize labor costs, employers wish to fill positions with the highest recruiting and training costs with employees who will stay with the company for the longest time. Because employers cannot predict which individuals will be most likely to stay with the company, they use statistical averages for demographic groups of workers to assess the risk that any given individual will leave. Hall (1982) cites evidence showing that women stay in jobs for a substantially shorter time than men on average in the U.S. labor force. Statistical discrimination theory would suggest that employers' experiences would cause them to expect women to leave the firm sooner than men. On average, if employers believe women are more likely to leave, then they will be less likely to hire women for positions with high recruiting and training costs.

The logic of internal labor market theory suggests that investments in worker training are required for advancement on internal job ladders or hierarchies. Internal labor market theory suggests that when firm specific skills are important to a worker's productivity, the firm will develop job ladders through which workers are promoted as they gain more firm specific training (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Williamson 1975; Baron, Davis-Blake and Bielby

1986). The purpose of these job ladders is to tie workers to the firm by offering them incentives to stay, specifically, promotions and accompanying wage increases that they could not obtain in the external labor market. Bridges and Villemez (1991) and Pfeffer and Cohen (1984) found support for this version of internal labor market theory. Their findings indicated that the amount of post-hiring training received by the worker was positively associated with the presence of job ladders in organizations. Bills (1987) concluded that reducing turnover was a consistent explanation for the development of internal labor markets in his case studies of three firms, also supporting internal labor market theory.

If employers are less likely to invest in training for women, as statistical discrimination theory suggests, then internal labor market theory suggests that women will have fewer opportunities to advance on internal job ladders. Hence, if statistical discrimination theory is correct, women will be employed in lower level management positions that are less demanding and less rewarding than the positions held by men, all else equal.

Additionally, Britton and Thomas (1973) found that employment interviewers believed that women were more likely than men to be absent from work frequently, and Chusmir (1984) found that personnel administrators believed that women were less likely than men to have the personality characteristics needed for success in management. Other researchers have found that men tend to believe that women are less likely to possess the characteristics needed for success in management (Schein, Mueller and Jacobson 1989; Brenner, Tomkiewicz and Schein 1989), although women generally believe that men and women are equally likely to possess these characteristics. The logic of statistical discrimination theory would suggest that these beliefs about women may cause employers to assign women to less demanding and less rewarding management positions.

In summary, applied to managers, the logic of statistical discrimination theory suggests that if employers believe that women are more likely than men to leave the firm, then women will be assigned to positions requiring less training, fewer firm specific skills, and less commitment and attachment to the firm. If employers believe that women are not as willing as men to work long hours, women may be found in positions that require fewer hours of work weekly as well. Because demands are fewer, women's positions also may be commensurately less rewarding in that they will be at lower hierarchical levels on average and that they will offer, on average, lower salaries and less likelihood of promotion to top management. These expectations are summarized in the following general hypothesis:

H2: Women will be employed in less demanding and less rewarding positions than men.

Gender Role Congruence Theory

In general terms, the concept of gender roles suggests that social norms exist to reinforce gender differences in values, attitudes, and behavior. As part of the social structure, gender roles function to achieve social cohesion by tying the individual to the social system. Generally speaking, in western industrial society, the female gender role is that of homemaker and the male gender role is that of provider (Burn and Probert in preparation; Marini and Brinton 1984; Powell 1993; Thompson and Pleck 1986). Because individuals are socialized to value those behaviors that are required by their ascribed social roles, women are socialized to value the role of homemaker and men are socialized to value the role of provider.

Gender role congruence theory suggests that there exist pressures on individuals to enact behaviors that fulfill gender role expectations and to abstain from behaviors that violate gender role expectations. Like all social norms, gender norms for behavior are reinforced by external pressures to conform as well as by internalization (Gomez-Mejia 1981). Hence, individuals who fulfill gender role expectations will be rewarded by others and the self. Individuals who violate gender role expectations will be punished by others and by the self. Others may reward the individual with praise and punish the individual with social slights or ostracism. The self may reward the individual with high self-esteem and punish the individual with anxiety and loss of self-esteem.

This general portrayal of gender role congruence pressures is deliberately simplified for clarity of presentation, and is probably too simplistic in contemporary society. Research has shown that gender role socialization is best conceptualized as a continuum, such that some children are brought up to be more androgynous while others are more gender-typed (Bem 1974). Freedman and Phillips (1988) argued that gender-type explains a larger percentage of variation in work behavior than biological gender. The assignment of the role of homemaker to women and the role of provider to men is probabilistic, not absolute, and androgynous behavior is accepted and valued by many. Burn (in press) cited two studies showing that androgynous men were rated more favorably than traditionally gender-typed men (Cramer, Dragna, Cupp, and Stewart 1991; Lombardo, Francis and Brown 1988). She also cited previous authors who argued that good managers possess both masculine and feminine traits (Cann and Siegfried 1990; Schein, Mueller, and Jacobson 1989).

Yet, research has shown that gender stereotypes changed little between 1972 and 1988 (Bergen and Williams 1991). While minor deviations from gender roles may be frequently tolerated, behavior that completely relinquishes

the gender role to embrace the role of the opposite gender is relatively rare and may still be sanctioned in western society. Also, the rewarding of behavior consistent with the gender role may occur more frequently in contemporary society than the sanctioning of behavior that violates the gender role. Despite these qualifications, evidence that women conduct more housework and child care than men (Bernardo, Shehan and Leslie 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1988; Blair and Lichter 1991; Burn in press; Hochschild 1989; Pavan 1987; Presland and Antill 1987; Vannoy-Hiller and Philliber 1989; Yogeve 1981) and that men are more likely than women to be in the labor force full time than women (Powell 1993) indicates that the traditional gender roles of homemaker and provider are still often enacted. As such, gender role congruence theory may still be applicable in contemporary society.

Applied to working managers, gender role congruence theory suggests that women will be rewarded for enacting the role of homemaker and men will be rewarded for enacting the role of provider. Failure to enact the gender role sufficiently may result in sanctioning. Hence, women, more than men, will feel pressure to balance career and family while men, more than women, will feel pressure to excel in the career domain (Biernat and Wortman 1991; Burn in press; Crosby 1984). Women in management who conduct more household labor may be rewarded for doing so because the behavior is consistent with the female gender role. Men who conduct more household labor may experience sanctions as gender role violators. The implication is that employers may be more willing to accommodate women's desires to balance work and family than men's.

Recent studies of women and men in management support gender role congruence theory. For example, Schneer and Reitman (1990) found that withdrawing from the labor force for a period of time had a larger negative impact on men's earnings than on women's. Lobel and St. Clair (1992) found that among parents of pre-school children with a strong family orientation, women received larger merit salary increases than men. Among parents of pre-school children with a strong career orientation, men received larger merit salary increases than women.

Schneer and Reitman's (1993) findings also support gender role congruence theory. They found that married men with children whose wives were not employed outside the home earned significantly more than married men with children whose wives were employed outside the home. This finding may be interpreted as showing that employers rewarded men who fulfilled the role of sole provider for the family. Schneer and Reitman (1993) also found that single women without children earned less than married women with children whose husbands worked outside the home. This finding may be interpreted as

showing that employers rewarded working women who fulfilled the homemaker role, which is consistent with gender role congruence theory.

The logic of gender role congruence theory suggests that gender and participation in household labor will interact to affect position demands and rewards. For this reason, we expected that, among managers who participated extensively in household labor, men more than women would be penalized in terms of salary, hierarchical level, and other work rewards. Since position rewards are associated with position demands, participation in household labor may influence the demands placed on men in management as well.

H3: The negative relationships between participation in household labor and position demands/rewards will be stronger for men than for women.

METHOD

Data Collection

Survey data were collected in 1989 from a sample of 800 randomly selected middle managers employed in nine regional offices of a major Canadian firm. Usual assurances of confidentiality concerning the identity of the company were made, hence, only general information about the company can be provided here. The firm is large, publicly held, and operates in the service sector. It has a large market share in its industry in Canada and competes internationally as well. In terms of the participation of women in middle management, this company is not typical of large Canadian organizations. In 1984, women comprised an estimated 37% of the middle-level managers in the company, and the average female middle manager's earnings were about 90% of those of her male counterpart's. By comparison, women comprised only 30.3% of all managerial *and* administrative workers in Canada in 1984; and in that broad occupational category, women were paid, on average, only 62.1% of the earnings of men in 1983 (Labour Canada 1986: 19, 46). Hence, this company appears to have made more progress in achieving equity between men and women in management than most Canadian firms.

Of the original 800 surveys administered, 672 (84%) were returned. Among the respondents, 553 (82%) declared themselves to be married or living with a partner. All multivariate analyses were conducted twice, once using the responses of the 553 married managers exclusively and once using the responses of all 672 managers in the sample. The responses of married managers are depicted in the tables, and any differences in findings when unmarried managers were included in the analyses are discussed in the text.

Measures

Participation in household labor was assessed by survey items asking what percentage of the family's cooking, housework, and transportation of children was performed by the respondent. The sum of these three percentages constituted the participation in household labor index. The index had a theoretical range of 0 to 300, where a higher score indicated greater household responsibilities. The actual range among the married sample was 6 to 230, with a median of 72.

Individuals scoring above the median on the participation in household labor index were considered "career-family managers," and those below the median were considered "career-primary managers." Using this operational definition, there were 246 career-family women, 78 career-family men, 26 career-primary women, and 322 career-primary men in the total sample. Among the married respondents, there were 199 career-family women, 76 career-family men, 13 career-primary women, and 265 career-primary men. To determine whether findings were sensitive to the use of the median split, the multivariate analyses were replicated using 60 as a cutoff point to define the categories.

Although 78 men fit our definition of a career-family manager, it is important to note that career-family women conducted a considerably larger percentage of household tasks than did career-family men. Among the married respondents, the mean score for career-family women on the participation in household labor index was 146 compared to 88 for career-family men. The mean scores for married career-primary women and men were 51 and 50, respectively.

Five position characteristics were assessed by averaging the survey responses of all individuals holding the same position. The position was considered to be the hierarchical level within the functional department. For example, all managers in the finance department who were two layers below the top executive in the company were considered to hold the same position. Managers in five departments and five hierarchical levels were included in the study. Since two of the departments had fewer than five hierarchical levels, there were 21 rather than 25 different positions included in the analyses.

The five position characteristics measured included pay level, perceived promotion opportunities, required hours, skill requirements, and required commitment. Individual-level measures were also included in the data set, including pay, promotion opportunities, days of training received, attachment, commitment, years of service with the company, education, age and hours worked

weekly. The specific measures used are depicted in Table 1.² All items listed are self-explanatory, except the commitment measure. The specific survey items comprising the commitment index were:

Would you accept a demotion in order to keep working for this organization? (1=yes, 0=no)

If you were denied a promotion that you had anticipated or thought you deserved, would you leave your present company? (0=yes, 1=no)

Could you just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type of work were similar? (0=yes, 1=no)

If your company was in financial difficulty, which of the following would you be willing to do: take a pay cut (coded 1), work overtime without pay (coded 1), or neither (coded 0)?

Previous work by Daymont and Andrisani (1984) and Gerhart (1990) has shown that the field in which the highest degree was obtained explains a significant proportion of the gender difference in earnings. For this reason, respondents reporting that they had received a graduate degree were asked to indicate whether their field of study was human resource management (HRM), management information systems (MIS), marketing, finance, operations management, or other. All statistical analyses were conducted separately for the subset of managers holding graduate degrees to determine whether gender or participation in household labor effects obtained when field of study was controlled. "Other" was the omitted category in these analyses. Since none of these managers reported holding operations management degrees, this variable was dropped.

Analyses

Two types of multivariate analyses were conducted to examine the data for gender and participation in household labor effects. First, discriminant analysis was used to determine which characteristics were the most important predictors of whether the individual was a career-family woman, a career-family man, or a career-primary man. There were too few career-primary women in the sample to include in these analyses. Second, regression analysis was conducted to examine the effects of gender, participation in household labor, and their interaction on position characteristics and individual outcomes. In these analyses, the individual's age, years of service with the company, hours worked weekly, and commitment level were controlled.

The two sets of analyses have complementary strengths and weaknesses. The discriminant analysis allowed us to estimate the relationship of gender and

² Means, standard deviations, and correlations among study variables are available from the first author upon request.

TABLE 1
Measures

Gender = Female coded 1, Male coded 0.

Household Labor = % of the family's cooking, housework, and transportation of children performed by the respondent. The three percentages were summed to create a continuous variable with a theoretical range of 0 to 300, where a higher score indicates greater participation in household labor.

Age = Continuous in years

Department = What is your department? (Finance, Computer Services, Marketing and Sales, Human Resources, Public Relations)

Position = Hierarchical Level within Department

WORK DEMANDS:

Years of Service = Years with the present company

Graduate Degree = Professional, master's, or doctoral degree coded 1, otherwise 0.

Academic Speciality = If you obtained an M.B.A., could you indicate your area of specialization? (Management Information Systems, Engineering/Production and Operations, Human Resources/Personnel, Finance/Accounting, Marketing/Sales, Other)

Hours Worked Weekly = On average, how many hours do you work in a week?

Training Received = How many days in total have you spent in training programs since you have been with your company?

Attachment = Do you think that long-term attachment to your present company is important to your career development? (1=yes, 0=no)

Commitment = 4-item index ($\alpha = .58$)

Position Hours Requirements = Average hours worked weekly for those in the same position

Position Required Commitment = Average score on 4-item index for those in the same position

Position General Skill Requirements = % in the position reporting a professional, master's or doctoral degree

Position Firm-Specific Skill Requirements =

Average years of service with the firm for those in the same position

Average days of training received from the firm for those in the same position

% in the position agreeing that staying with the firm is important to their careers

WORK REWARDS:

Salary = 1989 pre-tax earnings

Promotion Opportunities = Has your promotion history prepared you for top management positions in the future? (1=yes, 0=no)

Hierarchical Level = How many managerial levels are there between you and the top executive in your company? (High score indicates manager at a lower hierarchical level)

Position Pay Level = Average 1989 pre-tax earnings for those in the same position

Position Promotion Opportunities = % in the position agreeing that they were being prepared for top management

participation in household labor to multiple labor market outcomes simultaneously. The weakness of the discriminant analysis is that findings may be affected by using arbitrary cutoff points to define the career-family and career-primary categories. We overcame this weakness partially by replicating the discriminant analyses using a different cutoff point to define the categories. The regression analyses overcome this weakness by using the continuous measure of participation in household labor. Regression, however, could only be used to estimate effects on the labor market outcomes one at a time. By conducting both sets of analyses and examining the findings for convergence, we could be more confident that our statistical conclusions were robust.

RESULTS

Discriminant Results

Table 2 shows the results of the discriminant analyses conducted on the entire sample of managers and the subsamples of managers with and without graduate degrees. To conserve degrees of freedom, the eight position characteristics measures were not included in the discriminant analyses, rather, hierarchical level and four dummy variables indicating functional department were used to represent position.

Percentage of correctly classified respondents ranged from 74 to 77%, regardless of whether all respondents or only married respondents were included. When a cutoff of 60 on the household labor index was used to classify respondents as career-family or career-primary, the percentage of cases correctly classified dropped slightly, ranging from 70 to 75%. Using 60 as a cutoff point had no other meaningful effect on the results, and these analyses will not be discussed further for this reason.

In all discriminant analyses conducted, two discriminant functions were significantly associated with the grouping variable classifying respondents as career-primary men, career-family men, or career-family women. In all analyses, group centroids indicated that function 1 discriminated between career-family women and career-primary men with career-family men falling between the other two groups in discriminant function scores. Group centroids indicated that function 2 discriminated between career-family men and career-primary men, with career-family women falling between the other two groups in discriminant function scores.

The coefficients depicted in the table are the correlations between variables and the discriminant functions. These correlations indicate the relative importance of each variable in distinguishing between groups. Variables showing a magnitude of correlation of .30 or higher will be discussed in the

TABLE 2

Results of Discriminant Analyses: Respondents Without Graduate Degrees

| <i>Married and Unmarried Respondents (n = 646)</i> | | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Function 1</i> | <i>Function 2</i> |
| Salary | .46 | .06 |
| Age | .23 | .08 |
| Promotion Opportunities | .22 | .09 |
| Hours/Week | .25 | .11 |
| Commitment | -.12 | -.13 |
| Training | .03 | -.30 |
| Attachment | -.11 | .13 |
| Years of Service | .10 | .07 |
| Graduate Degree | -.10 | -.05 |
| Hierarchical Level | -.03 | -.66 |
| Marketing Dept. | .08 | .44 |
| Finance Dept. | .02 | -.09 |
| Public Relations Dept. | .01 | -.08 |
| Computer Services Dept. | .09 | -.09 |
| Group Centroids: | | |
| Career-Family Women | -1.48 | 0.04 |
| Career-Family Men | 0.63 | -0.86 |
| Career-Primary Men | 0.98 | 0.18 |
| Chi-Square (df) | 615.46 (26) | 64.32 (12) |
| <i>Married Respondents Only (n = 540)</i> | | |
| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Function 1</i> | <i>Function 2</i> |
| Salary | .46 | .11 |
| Age | .25 | .13 |
| Promotion Opportunities | .23 | .09 |
| Hours/Week | .25 | .15 |
| Commitment | -.09 | -.05 |
| Training | .05 | -.26 |
| Attachment | -.12 | .16 |
| Years of Service | .12 | .11 |
| Graduate Degree | -.10 | -.10 |
| Hierarchical Level | -.03 | -.65 |
| Marketing Dept. | .09 | .46 |
| Finance Dept. | .02 | -.07 |
| Public Relations Dept. | -.01 | -.09 |
| Computer Services Dept. | .08 | -.13 |
| Group Centroids: | | |
| Career-Family Women | -1.54 | -0.20 |
| Career-Family Men | 0.76 | -0.85 |
| Career-Primary Men | 0.94 | 0.39 |
| Chi-Square (df) | 552.43 (26) | 78.79 (12) |

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Results of Discriminant Analyses: Respondents Without Graduate Degrees*Married and Unmarried Respondents (n = 444)*

| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Function 1</i> | <i>Function 2</i> |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Salary | .49 | .05 |
| Age | .29 | .16 |
| Promotion Opportunities | .17 | .13 |
| Hours/Week | .32 | .19 |
| Commitment | -.11 | -.13 |
| Training | .07 | -.25 |
| Attachment | -.10 | .10 |
| Years of Service | .15 | .10 |
| Hierarchical Level | -.11 | -.67 |
| Marketing Dept. | .13 | .40 |
| Finance Dept. | -.01 | .01 |
| Public Relations Dept. | .00 | .09 |
| Computer Services Dept. | .06 | -.10 |
| Group Centroids: | | |
| Career-Family Women | -1.76 | 0.06 |
| Career-Family Men | 0.54 | -0.97 |
| Career-Primary Men | 1.03 | 0.18 |
| Chi-Square (df) | 485.28 (25) | 55.09 (11) |

Married Respondents Only (n = 385)

| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Function 1</i> | <i>Function 2</i> |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Salary | .48 | .06 |
| Age | .28 | .16 |
| Promotion Opportunities | .17 | .16 |
| Hours/Week | .31 | .21 |
| Commitment | -.08 | -.06 |
| Training | .07 | -.25 |
| Attachment | -.11 | .12 |
| Years of Service | .16 | .10 |
| Hierarchical Level | -.11 | -.68 |
| Marketing Dept. | .12 | .41 |
| Finance Dept. | .00 | .03 |
| Public Relations Dept. | .00 | .09 |
| Computer Services Dept. | .05 | -.13 |
| Group Centroids: | | |
| Career-Family Women | -1.90 | 0.08 |
| Career-Family Men | 0.52 | -1.04 |
| Career-Primary Men | 1.05 | 0.22 |
| Chi-Square (df) | 453.87 (25) | 61.72 (11) |

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Results of Discriminant Analyses: Respondents With Graduate Degrees

| <i>Married and Unmarried Respondents (n = 202)</i> | | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Function 1</i> | <i>Function 2</i> |
| Salary | -.28 | .22 |
| Age | .06 | .36 |
| Promotion Opportunities | -.40 | .02 |
| Hours/Week | -.01 | .25 |
| Commitment | .14 | .08 |
| Training | .19 | .50 |
| Attachment | .16 | -.16 |
| Years of Service | .23 | .20 |
| Hierarchical Level | -.18 | .35 |
| Marketing Dept. | .08 | -.32 |
| Finance Dept. | -.08 | .29 |
| Public Relations Dept. | .06 | .29 |
| Computer Services Dept. | -.16 | .05 |
| Group Centroids: | | |
| Career-Family Women | 1.15 | -0.04 |
| Career-Family Men | -0.68 | 0.92 |
| Career-Primary Men | -1.04 | -0.21 |
| Chi-Square (df) | 169.86 (25) | 22.24 (11) |
| <i>Married Respondents Only (n = 155)</i> | | |
| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Function 1</i> | <i>Function 2</i> |
| Salary | -.26 | .09 |
| Age | .00 | .24 |
| Promotion Opportunities | -.44 | -.03 |
| Hours/Week | -.01 | .16 |
| Commitment | .12 | .01 |
| Training | .16 | .45 |
| Attachment | .20 | -.14 |
| Years of Service | .21 | .15 |
| Hierarchical Level | -.21 | .32 |
| Marketing Dept. | .06 | -.34 |
| Finance Dept. | -.02 | .27 |
| Public Relations Dept. | .06 | .22 |
| Computer Services Dept. | -.22 | -.01 |
| Marketing Degree | .10 | -.34 |
| Finance Degree | .07 | .22 |
| HRM Degree | .19 | .09 |
| MIS Degree | -.34 | .21 |
| Group Centroids: | | |
| Career-Family Women | 1.16 | -0.02 |
| Career-Family Men | -0.91 | 1.05 |
| Career-Primary Men | -1.00 | -0.38 |
| Chi-Square (df) | 141.25 (28) | 29.57 (13) |

following paragraphs. The relative size of the correlations did not differ substantially regardless of whether all respondents or only married respondents were included. For this reason, the discriminant results for all respondents will not be discussed further.

The function 1 results for the entire sample of married managers indicated that the major factor distinguishing between career-family women and career-primary men was salary. Group centroids indicated that career-family women earned lower salaries than career-primary men. The function 1 findings for the subsample without graduate degrees were very similar. The main difference was that hours worked weekly was a more important discriminator between groups in the subsample without graduate degrees than in the total sample. In the subsample of respondents without graduate degrees, career-family women earned lower salaries and worked fewer hours weekly than career-primary men on average.

Group centroids indicated that career-family men were much more similar to career-primary men than to career-family women on function 1 scores. This was true in both the total sample and the subsample without graduate degrees. Hence, the function 1 results may be interpreted as supporting hypothesis 2, which argued that job demands and rewards would be associated with gender. However, since career-family women conducted considerably more household labor than either group of men, the function 1 results may also be interpreted as supporting hypothesis 1, which argued that job demands and rewards would be associated with participation in household labor.

The function 2 results for the entire sample indicated that the major differences between career-family men and career-primary men were that career-primary men were fewer levels away from top management (i.e., they were employed at higher levels in the corporate hierarchy) and were more likely to be in the marketing department. The function 2 results for the subsample without graduate degrees were very similar.

Group centroids indicated that career-family women were about midway between career-family men and career-primary men in the function 2 scores for the entire married sample. In the subsample without graduate degrees, career-family women were much more similar to career-primary men than to career-family men in their function 2 scores. The finding that position differences between career-family men and career-primary men were larger than position differences between career-family women and career-primary men supported hypothesis 3, which stated that participation in household labor would be more strongly negatively related to position job demands and rewards for men than for women.

Dummy variables indicating field in which the highest degree was obtained were included in the analyses for managers holding graduate degrees.

The function 1 findings for respondents holding graduate degrees indicated that the major variables discriminating between career-primary men and career-family women were perceived promotion opportunities and holding an MIS degree. Group centroids indicated that career-primary men were more likely to believe that they were being prepared for top management and to hold MIS degrees than career-family women.

Group centroids also indicated that career-family men were much more similar to career-primary men than to career-family women on their function 1 scores. These findings may be interpreted as supporting hypothesis 2, which stated that gender would be associated with job demands and rewards. Since career-family women conducted considerably more household labor than career-family men, however, these results may also be interpreted as supporting hypothesis 1. Also, the fact that career-family women were less likely to hold MIS degrees than career-primary or career-family men is unlikely to be due to statistical discrimination, which is the theoretical basis of hypothesis 2. Rather, degree specialization was conceptualized as a control for individual differences in career choice.

The function 2 findings for respondents holding graduate degrees indicated that the major variables discriminating between career-family men and career-primary men were training, hierarchical level, being employed in the marketing department and holding a degree in marketing. Group centroids indicated that career-family men had received more days of training from the company but were lower in the management hierarchy and less likely to hold marketing degrees and to be employed in the marketing department than career-primary men. Again, the measure of degree specialization was conceptualized as a control variable and differences between groups in degree specialization were attributed to individual differences in career choices.

Group centroids indicated that career-family women were more similar to career-primary men than to career-family men in their function 2 scores. The finding that position differences between career-family men and career-primary men were larger than position differences between career-family women and career-primary men supported hypothesis 3, which stated that participation in household labor would be more strongly negatively associated with position demands and rewards for men than for women.

Regression Results

Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the results of the regression analyses for the married respondents. Individual characteristics controlled in these analyses were years of service with the company, hours worked weekly, level of organizational commitment, age, and whether the individual held a graduate degree. In

the subsample of respondents holding graduate degrees, the field in which the graduate degree was obtained was controlled via a set of dummy variables. The unstandardized regression coefficients depicted indicate the effects of gender, participation in household labor and their interaction on each dependent variable. The R^2 added indicates the amount of additional variance in the dependent variable explained when gender, housework, and their interaction were added to the equation. The adjusted R^2 is shown for the entire equation.

It should be noted here that the regression results were substantially different when unmarried respondents were included in the analyses. When unmarried respondents were included in the regressions, many findings that had been significant in the analyses including married respondents only were no longer significant. Specifically, when only married respondents were included in the analyses, gender was significant in 17 of the regression equations, household labor was significant in 17 equations, and the gender by household labor interaction was significant in 12 equations. When unmarried respondents were added to the analyses, gender was significant in 10 of the regression equations, household labor was significant in 7 of the regression equations, and the gender by household labor interaction was significant in 3 of the equations. In the following summary of the regression results, specific differences in findings are noted in the text.

Table 3 shows the results of the regressions conducted on the entire sample of married respondents. Dependent variables showing substantively significant effects of gender, household labor, and their interaction as indicated by an R^2 added of .05 or greater included average promotion opportunity in the position, individual salary, and individual promotion opportunity. There was a significant and negative gender effect on average promotion opportunity in the position, individual salary, and individual promotion opportunity. All three of these findings supported hypothesis 2, which stated that female gender would be negatively associated with position demands and rewards. The interaction between gender and household labor had a positive and significant effect on average promotion opportunity in the position, as predicted by hypothesis 3. This interaction was not significant when unmarried respondents were added to the analysis, however.

Of the other significant findings depicted, the only ones that were replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analyses were (1) the positive association between household labor and days of training, (2) the positive association between household labor and levels from top management, and (3) the negative association between the gender by household labor interaction and levels from top management. The positive association between household labor and levels from top management indicated that those conducting more household labor were lower in the management hierarchy. As such,

TABLE 3
Results of Regression Analyses: Total Married Sample

| <i>Dependent Variable</i> | <i>Gender</i> | <i>Housework</i> | <i>Interaction</i> | <i>R² Added</i> | <i>Adjusted R²</i> |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Ave Salary | -1657 ^b (665) | -11 ^a (6) | 10 (7) | .04 ^d | .26 |
| Ave Hours | -.69 ^a (.40) | -.01 ^d (.003) | .01 ^b (.004) | .02 ^c | .30 |
| Ave Promotion Opportunity | -15.4 ^d (3.2) | -.03 (.03) | .08 ^b (.03) | .09 ^d | .12 |
| Ave Years of Service | -.74 (.47) | -.01 ^c (.004) | .01 ^b (.005) | .01 ^a | .20 |
| % Graduate Degrees | 7.73 ^b (3.56) | .04 (.03) | -.08 ^b (.04) | .01 ^a | .08 |
| % Attached | -5.74 ^b (2.76) | -.05 ^b (.02) | .06 ^b (.03) | .01 ^b | .003 |
| Ave Commitment | .01 (.01) | .0002 ^b (.0001) | .0001 (.0001) | .02 ^c | .07 |
| Ave Days of Training | -.33 (.57) | -.006 (.005) | .004 (.006) | .01 | .11 |
| Salary | -4362 ^d (822) | -9 (7) | -2 (8) | .09 ^d | .87 |
| Promotion Opportunity | -.47 ^d (.14) | -.001 (.001) | .002 (.001) | .08 ^d | .09 |
| Days of Training | .87 (1.64) | .05 ^c (.01) | -.03 ^b (.02) | .01 ^c | .51 |
| Attachment | .07 (.13) | -.0005 (.001) | .001 (.001) | .04 ^d | .09 |
| Levels from Top Mgt | .69 ^c (.23) | .01 ^d (.002) | -.01 ^d (.002) | .04 ^d | .14 |

Notes.

1. Unstandardized regression coefficients are depicted with their standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by the superscripts as follows: ^a = $p < .10$; ^b = $p < .05$; ^c = $p < .01$; ^d = $p < .001$.

2. Control variables included the respondent's age, years of service with the company, hours worked weekly, commitment level, and whether or not the respondent held a graduate degree.

3. R^2 added indicates the amount of additional variance in the dependent variable explained when gender, housework, and their interaction were added to the equation. The adjusted R^2 is indicated for the entire equation.

this finding supported hypothesis 1, which stated that household labor would be negatively associated with position demands and rewards. The positive association between household labor and days of training refuted the hypothesis, however.

The negative association between the gender by household labor interaction and levels from top management supported hypothesis 3, which stated that household labor would be more strongly negatively associated with position demands and rewards for men than for women. The negative interaction effect indicated that the slope of the association between household labor and levels from top management was less strongly positive for women than for men (recall that gender was coded 1 for female and 0 for male). Since a positive association indicated that those who conducted more household labor were lower in the management hierarchy, the interaction effect means that men were penalized more than women for conducting household labor.

Regression analyses (not shown) run on the data for men and women separately indicated that household labor was significantly and positively associated with levels from top management for men and significantly and negatively associated with levels from top management for women. The direction of this effect supported gender role congruence theory, which predicted that women would be rewarded for household labor while men would be penalized for household labor.

Table 4 shows the results for the married respondents without graduate degrees. Dependent variables showing substantively significant effects of gender, household labor, and their interaction as indicated by an R^2 added of .05 or greater included average promotion opportunity in the position, individual salary, and individual promotion opportunity. There was a significant and negative gender effect on average promotion opportunity in the position, individual salary, and individual promotion opportunity. All three of these findings support hypothesis 2, however, the findings for average promotion opportunities were not replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analysis. There was a significant and negative effect of household labor on promotion opportunity, as predicted by hypothesis 1, however, this effect was not replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analysis.

Of the other significant findings depicted, the ones that were replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analyses included none of the gender effects, four of the household labor effects, and one of the interaction effects. The household labor effects that were replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analyses included the negative associations of household labor with average salary and average hours worked weekly and the positive association of household labor with levels from top management. These findings supported hypothesis 1, showing that household labor was

TABLE 4
Results of Regression Analyses:
Married Respondents Without Graduate Degrees

| <i>Dependent Variable</i> | <i>Gender</i> | <i>Housework</i> | <i>Interaction</i> | <i>R² Added</i> | <i>Adjusted R²</i> |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Ave Salary | -1147 (842) | -12 ^a (7) | 7 (8) | .03 ^d | .28 |
| Ave Hours | -.44 (.51) | -.01 ^c (.004) | .008 (.005) | .02 ^b | .31 |
| Ave Promotion Opportunity | -8.31 ^b (3.68) | -.02 (.03) | .03 (.04) | .06 ^d | .12 |
| Ave Years of Service | -.65 (.61) | -.011 ^b (.005) | .01 (.01) | .01 | .22 |
| % Graduate Degrees | 9.93 ^b (4.49) | .04 (.03) | -.08 ^a (.04) | .01 | .004 |
| % Attached | -2.12 (3.55) | -.04 (.03) | .02 (.03) | .02 ^b | .02 |
| Ave Commitment | .005 (.01) | .0002 ^a (.0001) | -.0001 (.0001) | .01 | .06 |
| Ave Days of Training | -.004 (.72) | -.01 ^a (.006) | .003 (.007) | .02 ^b | .11 |
| Salary | -6444 ^d (991) | -12 (8) | 10 (10) | .09 ^d | .89 |
| Promotion Opportunity | -.46 ^b (.18) | -.002 ^a (.001) | .003 (.002) | .06 ^d | .05 |
| Days of Training | .04 (2.12) | .04 ^b (.02) | -.02 (.02) | .01 ^a | .46 |
| Attachment | -.02 (.17) | -.0001 (.001) | .002 (.002) | .04 ^d | .08 |
| Levels from Top Mgt | .49 ^a (.29) | .008 ^d (.002) | -.009 ^c (.003) | .03 ^c | .17 |

Notes.

1. Unstandardized regression coefficients are depicted with their standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by the superscripts as follows: ^a = $p < .10$; ^b = $p < .05$; ^c = $p < .01$; ^d = $p < .001$.
2. Control variables included the respondent's age, years of service with the company, hours worked weekly, and commitment level.
3. R^2 added indicates the amount of additional variance in the dependent variable explained when gender, housework, and their interaction were added to the equation. The adjusted R^2 is indicated for the entire equation.

negatively associated with position demands and rewards. Also replicated was the positive association between household labor and days of training, which refuted hypothesis 1.

The interaction effect that was replicated when unmarried respondents were included was the negative association between the gender by household labor interaction and levels from top management. As explained above, the negative direction of the interaction effect supported hypothesis 3, which stated that men would be more strongly penalized for participation in household labor than women.

Table 5 shows the results for the married respondents holding graduate degrees. Seven of the dependent variables showed substantively significant effects of gender, household labor, and their interaction as indicated by an R^2 added of .05 or greater. These included promotion opportunities and average promotion opportunities, both of which showed negative and significant associations with gender that were replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analyses. These findings supported hypothesis 2.

Two of the dependent variables, percentage holding graduate degrees and attachment, showed no significant regression coefficients on gender, household labor or the gender by household labor interaction. Salary also showed no significant regression coefficients, however, when unmarried respondents were added to the analysis, salary showed a negative and significant association with gender. This finding was consistent with hypothesis 2.

Percentage attached to the company showed a significant and negative association with gender, supporting hypothesis 2, and a significant and positive association with the gender by household labor interaction, supporting hypothesis 3. However, these findings were not replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analysis.

Levels from top management showed significant and positive associations with household labor and gender, supporting hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. The coefficient on household labor remained significant when unmarried respondents were added to the analysis, however, the coefficient on gender did not. Levels from top management showed a significant and negative association with the gender by household labor interaction, supporting hypothesis 3, and the interaction remained significant when unmarried respondents were added to the analyses.

None of the other significant findings depicted were replicated when unmarried respondents were added to the analyses.

TABLE 5
Results of Regression Analyses:
Married Respondents With Graduate Degrees

| <i>Dependent Variable</i> | <i>Gender</i> | <i>Housework</i> | <i>Interaction</i> | <i>R² Added</i> | <i>Adjusted R²</i> |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Ave Salary | -965 (1138) | -2 (12) | -1 (14) | .04 ^b | .33 |
| Ave Hours | -.13 (.63) | -.01 (.007) | .006 (.008) | .02 | .45 |
| Ave Promotion Opportunity | -22.1 ^c (6.79) | -.05 (.07) | .13 (.08) | .10 ^d | .19 |
| Ave Years of Service | -.38 (.76) | -.008 (.008) | .01 (.01) | .01 | .20 |
| % Graduate Degrees | -5.70 (6.04) | .002 (.07) | -.01 (.07) | .05 ^b | .21 |
| % Attached | -11.3 ^c (4.23) | -.07 (.05) | .13 ^b (.05) | .05 ^b | .24 |
| Ave Commitment | .02 (.02) | .0001 (.0002) | -.0001 (.0002) | .04 ^a | .11 |
| Ave Days of Training | .68 (.73) | .01 (.008) | -.01 (.01) | .005 | .58 |
| Salary | -296 (1544) | 8 (17) | -27 (19) | .11 ^d | .68 |
| Promotion Opportunity | -.58 ^b (.24) | -.001 (.003) | .002 (.003) | .13 ^d | .21 |
| Days of Training | 4.62 (2.82) | .08 ^b (.03) | -.08 ^b (.03) | .02 ^a | .47 |
| Attachment | .20 (.23) | -.001 (.002) | .001 (.002) | .07 ^c | .12 |
| Levels from Top Mgt | 1.26 ^c (.43) | .018 ^d (.005) | -.02 ^d (.005) | .12 ^d | .18 |

Notes.

1. Unstandardized regression coefficients are depicted with their standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by the superscripts as follows: ^a = $p < .10$; ^b = $p < .05$; ^c = $p < .01$; ^d = $p < .001$.
2. Control variables included the respondent's age, years of service with the company, hours worked weekly, commitment level, and a set of dummy variables indicating graduate degree specialization.
3. R^2 added indicates the amount of additional variance in the dependent variable explained when gender, housework, and their interaction were added to the equation. The adjusted R^2 is indicated for the entire equation.

DISCUSSION

All three sets of regression results indicated a substantively significant main effect of gender on salary, perceived promotion opportunities, and average perceived promotion opportunities in the position. The salary findings were replicated in the discriminant analyses conducted on the entire sample and the subsample without graduate degrees. In both of these cases, function 1, which differentiated career-family women from both groups of men, was most strongly correlated with salary. The promotion opportunities finding was replicated in the discriminant analysis conducted on the subsample holding graduate degrees. In this case, function 1 was most strongly correlated with perceived promotion opportunities.

One reason that gender was not as strongly related to salary in the subsample holding graduate degrees may have been the fact that controls for degree specialization were included in the analyses. Had we been able to include degree specialization for those individuals without graduate degrees, the gender difference in salary also may have been attenuated. Hence, we concluded that individual choice of degree specialization may have explained women's lower salaries in this case.

Controls for specialization did not explain the gender effect on perceived promotion opportunities, however. The gender difference in the perception that one was being prepared for top management was larger in the subsample holding graduate degrees, where degree specialization was controlled. This finding indicated that the more educated women, whom we might expect to find nearer the top of the corporate hierarchy, perceived themselves to be disadvantaged in opportunities for advancement compared to their male counterparts. This difference in perception may constitute evidence of a "glass ceiling," or hierarchical level beyond which women were not elevated. However, gender differences in actual hierarchical level did not obtain in the discriminant analyses or in the regression analyses when married and unmarried individuals were included. We concluded that if a glass ceiling existed in this company, it must have been located at a level higher than the middle management positions we were studying.

The gender by household labor interaction was significantly associated with hierarchical level in all three sets of regression analyses, and comprised a substantively significant effect in the subsample holding graduate degrees. This interaction was replicated in all three sets of discriminant analyses. In all three analyses, function 2, which differentiated career-family men from career-family women and career-primary men, was most strongly correlated with hierarchical level. We do not know the direction of causality for this effect. It is possible that the employer penalized career-family men by slowing their

hierarchical advancement. It is also possible that men who realized that their advancement had slowed chose to allocate a larger proportion of their time and effort to the family in response. Longitudinal data are needed to distinguish between these two possibilities.

Both explanations are consistent with gender role congruence theory, however. The theory suggests that behavior violating gender roles will be sanctioned, by external or internal sources or both. If the first explanation suggesting that employers sanctioned men for participating in household labor is correct, then the fit with gender role congruence theory is obvious. If the second explanation suggesting that men whose careers had plateaued chose to allocate more effort to the family is correct, then it is necessary to compare the men's behavior to the women's to find a fit with gender role congruence theory. Why is it that women whose careers had advanced to high levels did not reduce their participation in household labor to compensate for the increased burden of their positions as men did? Gender role congruence theory would suggest that the answer to this question is some combination of internal and external pressures on women to conform to the female gender role of homemaker.

We conclude that our findings join those of others (Schneer and Reitman 1993; 1990; Lobel and St. Clair 1992) suggesting that men and women in management are subject to gender role congruence pressures. The implication for the issue of mommy tracking in organizations is that men who choose to take advantage of work arrangements allowing a greater allocation of effort to the family may be penalized for doing so more than women.

One weakness of this research is the use of the case study design, which limits the extent to which results may be generalized to other settings. The reason we chose the case study design, however, was to complement previously published literature. Several high quality studies have been published using nationally representative samples, enhancing generalizability of results. Examples include work by England, Farkas, Kilbourne, and Dou (1988) and Bielby and Bielby (1988). Bielby and Baron's (1986) findings are also more generalizable than ours due to the inclusion of data from 500 firms in California.

These studies have made important contributions to our understanding of gender in the labor force. However, studies based on nationally representative samples generally lack controls for differences in the employing organizations, working conditions, and/or jobs held by workers in the same occupation. Bielby and Baron's (1986) study included measures of organizational and job characteristics, but lacked data on the human capital endowments of workers. Our case study design ensured that organizational characteristics were held constant and did not comprise alternative explanations for findings. Limiting our sample to middle-level managers controlled for many differences in

working conditions. Within the organization, we accounted for many position characteristics by examining the individual's level within their functional department. We argue that the controls for organization, working conditions, and position characteristics that were possible with the case study design complement the generalizability strengths of previously published work.

A possible next step for research in this area is to conduct other case studies to determine the generalizability of these findings. Longitudinal data sets examining whether managers' choices about career and family commitment precede or follow employers' decisions regarding position assignments are needed to improve our understanding of causal relationships between variables.

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Discrimination et vie familiale

Une étude de cas des carrières des hommes et des femmes en gestion

Le débat public sur la discrimination et la vie familiale montre que les gens se demandent si la carrière des femmes en gestion est entravée par la discrimination et si ceux et celles qui cherchent à équilibrer famille et carrière sont pénalisés. Cette recherche se centre sur ces questions en scrutant les résultats de carrière de 600 gestionnaires intermédiaires dans une grande compagnie canadienne. Nous avons examiné les effets du sexe et de la participation dans le travail domestique sur une grande variété de résultats. Utilisant une mesure de participation au travail domestique, nous avons classifié les gestionnaires selon qu'ils étaient orientés d'abord et avant tout sur leur carrière ou de façon relativement égale à la fois sur leur carrière et sur leur famille.

Pour élaborer des hypothèses vérifiables dans le cadre de cette recherche, nous avons recouru à la théorie du capital humain, à la théorie de la discrimination statistique et à la théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels. Brièvement dit, la logique de la théorie du capital humain propose que la participation au travail domestique est associée aux résultats atteints sur le marché du travail. Ceux qui choisissent de dépenser plus d'effort dans du travail hors marché vont se dépenser moins dans leur emploi afin de sauver de l'énergie. Pour ce motif, ceux qui participent beaucoup au travail domestique devraient se retrouver dans des emplois moins exigeants, toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, et moins rémunérateurs.

La logique de la discrimination statistique, pour sa part, propose qu'il y aura une relation entre le sexe et les résultats sur le marché du travail. Parce que les employeurs croient que les femmes ont moins de probabilités que les hommes à être gestionnaires efficaces et à demeurer longtemps avec la firme, ils affecteront les femmes à des positions administratives moins exigeantes et moins rémunératrices.

Enfin, la logique de la théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels propose qu'il y aura une relation négative plus forte pour les hommes que pour les femmes entre le travail domestique et le succès sur le marché du travail. Dans les sociétés industrielles occidentales, les femmes ont davantage la responsabilité des tâches ménagères et les hommes, un rôle de pourvoyeur. Les gens sont récompensés quand ils remplissent leur rôle présent et punis pour ces comportements qui divergent trop de ces rôles. Cela implique que les employeurs peuvent être plus enclins à répondre positivement aux femmes qu'aux hommes au désir d'équilibrer carrière et famille.

En 1989, nous avons envoyé des questionnaires à un échantillon de 800 cadres intermédiaires choisis au hasard dans neuf bureaux régionaux d'une grande firme canadienne, 672 (84 %) de ces questionnaires nous furent retournés. Nous avons mesuré la participation au travail domestique en demandant quel pourcentage de la cuisine familiale, de l'entretien et du transport des enfants était effectué par le répondant. La somme de ces trois pourcentages a constitué l'indice de participation au travail domestique. Ceux se situant au-dessus de la médiane de cet indice sont considérés comme des gestionnaires carrière-famille et ceux se situant sous la médiane sont appelés des gestionnaires de carrière d'abord. En utilisant ces définitions, nous avons identifié dans l'échantillon 246 femmes et 78 hommes carrière-famille, 26 femmes et 322 hommes carrière d'abord.

Le salaire était associé de façon significative et négative avec le genre féminin dans l'analyse multivariée que nous avons faite tant pour l'échantillon dans son ensemble que pour le sous échantillon « sans diplôme de deuxième cycle ». Cependant, le salaire n'était pas une variable significative dans l'analyse effectuée sur le sous échantillon « avec diplôme de deuxième cycle », peut-être parce que, dans ce sous échantillon, nous avons contrôlé le domaine de spécialisation du diplôme. Si nous avions été capables de contrôler cette variable dans le sous échantillon « sans diplôme de deuxième cycle », les différences sexuelles dans le salaire auraient peut-être été atténuées. Nous concluons donc que les choix individuels de domaine de spécialisation peuvent expliquer les salaires inférieurs des femmes dans ce cas.

Cependant, les contrôles pour le domaine de spécialisation n'expliquent pas l'effet du sexe sur les occasions perçues de promotion. Les différences sexuelles de perception d'être préparé pour des postes de haute direction étaient plus grandes dans le sous échantillon « avec un diplôme de deuxième cycle ». Cette conclusion indique que les femmes plus instruites — que l'on devrait trouver près du sommet de la hiérarchie — se perçoivent désavantagées dans leurs chances d'avancement comparativement aux hommes. Cette différence de perception peut constituer la preuve de l'existence d'un « plafond de verre » au niveau hiérarchique au-delà duquel les femmes n'ont pas accès. Cependant, les différences de sexe dans le niveau hiérarchique actuel n'ont pas été significatives dans plusieurs analyses multivariées effectuées. Nous avons conclu que

si un « plafond de verre » existait dans cette compagnie, il devait être situé à un niveau supérieur aux postes de cadre intermédiaire étudiés.

L'interaction entre le sexe et le travail domestique est associée de façon significative pour l'ensemble de l'échantillon et pour les deux sous échantillons, i.e. avec et sans diplôme de deuxième cycle. Le sens de cette relation est à l'effet que la participation au travail domestique est associée négativement avec le niveau hiérarchique pour les hommes et positivement pour les femmes. Nous ne connaissons pas la direction de causalité de cet effet. Il est possible que l'employeur ait pénalisé les hommes carrière-famille en ralentissant leur avancement hiérarchique. Il est aussi possible que ces hommes qui ont réalisé que leur avancement avait ralenti aient choisi en réaction de consacrer une plus grande proportion de leur temps et de leur effort à la famille. Des données longitudinales seraient nécessaires pour choisir entre ces deux possibilités.

Ces deux explications sont cependant conformes à la théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels. La théorie suggère que des comportements contraires aux rôles sexuels seront punis. Si la première explication est correcte, alors elle est conforme à cette théorie de façon évidente. Si la seconde est correcte, il est alors nécessaire de comparer les comportements des hommes et des femmes pour trouver une conformité avec la théorie. Pourquoi les femmes dont la carrière est rendue à de hauts niveaux n'ont pas, comme les hommes, réduit leur participation au travail domestique pour compenser le fardeau additionnel dans leur emploi? La théorie de la congruence des rôles sexuels répondrait à cette question en disant que c'est en raison de la pression faite sur les femmes de se conformer au rôle féminin de responsable des tâches ménagères.

Nous concluons, comme d'autres, que les hommes et les femmes gestionnaires sont sujet à des pressions de congruence de rôle sexuel. L'implication de ces résultats est que les hommes qui choisissent de profiter des aménagements de travail pour se consacrer davantage à leur famille peuvent être plus pénalisés que les femmes qui font de même.